"Last week, one of our infrastructure providers reported unauthorized access involving third-party server management software. One of our CDN nodes, located in Armenia, was hosted on a server supplied by this provider.
After receiving the alert from the affected provider, our engineering team took immediate action. Within 20 minutes, we stopped routing traffic through the server. We then reviewed and preserved the relevant security logs for investigation, securely wiped the server, and revoked its access to our other systems. The affected server has been permanently removed from our infrastructure."
> If you manage your own TLS certificates, we recommend revoking and reissuing them with new private keys as a precaution.
Only if you manage them yourself. If Bunny is managing them for you, they'll roll them for you.
It does not mean secrets were compromised. It means: If there is a risk customer secrets were compromised, the right thing to do is to assume they were and refresh everything. Even if there's no evidence of it.
It does not mean that at all, it’s sane risk management. There was an opportunity for someone to steal customer secrets so the safe thing to do is assume everything was compromised and revoke/reissue certificates even if nothing was stolen.
Call me pathologically unbiased, but I doubt this same article written by Cloudflare would get this response.
https://lowendtalk.com/discussion/222315/gcore-compromised-v...
The title is heavily misleading.
NGL it's the exact wording I'd personally like to see from a product that had an infra provider have an incident just so that I can mentally tune in enough to figure out if I need to care.
Bunny is doing the right thing here and owning it.
I'm unsure, but I have to ask: isn't this company Russian-controlled (with Luxembourg and Cyprus shell-company fronts)? Their Wikipedia entry[0] features a controversy involving RT (Russia Today); and a number of their top employees (i.e. Vsevolod Vayner) seem to live in Russian cities; and Moscow was their 2nd cloud location, after Luxembourg[1].
I'm not sure if I've got this right (most of the primary sources are Russian websites that block me and also block Western internet archives; I'm gleaning some things from Google preview caches). But: is it possible the #1 "European sovereign CDN" has been acting as a white-label reseller for Moscow? Is it possible they willingly trusted all of their customers' TLS certificates to a contractor operating from Russia?
Someone kindly fact-check me.
[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gcore#Controversies
[1] https://web.archive.org/web/20260420215140/https://www.strea...
> "An employee appears to be offering Medvedev access to intelligence information" [...] "This recording shows Michael Shurygin, then-head of GCore Russia, apparently discussing plans with former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in April 2021."
> [...] "The group laughs. Shurygin had made a pun that only works in Russian: “Introduced”—that is, внедрять (vnedryat’)—is ambiguous. It can also be understood to mean “to penetrate” or “to infiltrate.” So they would have infiltrated Luxembourg. Medvedev says, “I hope on behalf of the state.” And they laugh again."
https://correctiv.org/aktuelles/russland-ukraine-2/2023/02/1...
Yes, they absolutely could help. They could take an order over the phone. They could choose a subcontractor who delivered good service to the restaurant's customers. The restaurant is 100% responsible.
If I used a subcontractor for a client, not in a million years would I tell the client, 'the subcontractor's failure isn't my problem; I can't control them'. I would look like a joke, entirely unreliable and clueless.
While neither investigation has found any indication of unauthorized access to our server, we cannot completely rule out the possibility.
If unauthorized access to our CDN node did occur, the potentially exposed information would have been: temporarily cached CDN content, Pull Zone configurations, and TLS certificates stored on that server.
As an additional precaution, we have revoked and reissued all TLS certificates for bunny. net platform domains (b-cdn. net and bunny. run). Reissuance of managed TLS certificates for custom domains is ongoing and is expected to be completed within the next 24 hours. No action is required from customers using managed certificates. We will post a further update on our status page once this process is complete.
If you manage your own TLS certificates, we recommend revoking and reissuing them with new private keys as a precaution.
No other customer data, including bunny. net account data, was stored on the server in question, and no internal systems were affected.
When responding to a potential breach, the correct protocol is to contain the incident and PRESERVE EVERYTHING for investigation. Do not try to be selective at what data you keep or don't keep. They've unfortunately likely destroyed evidence and will not be able to determine if the attacker actually breached the server or not, and if so, how. This speaks to them having a poor or non-existent incident response plan.
maybe it's my brain just primed or attacks picked up pace recently
Are they talking about physical security? Someone grabbed the server, etc?
Colocation providers usually don't care about security beyond that, or has that changed?
Some time ago my colleague and I were doing some due-diligence on Bunny as a potential service provider.
We asked them some basic security questions, nothing low-level, just some basic high-level overview type of stuff to roughly check if they were following well-known best-practices.
Their response was a consistent and constant "cannot tell you due to security reasons".
That rang alarm bells. Any provider such as them who is not sufficiently confident in their security to be willing and able to discuss security at a high-level perspective is not worthy of trust as far as I am concerned.
TL;DR you get what you pay for.
As a customer, I couldn't ask anything more. No ambiguity, no downplaying, no word salads. If anything this incident increased my confidence in the company.
Oh right because American tech companies are not equally capable of shitty security.
Remind me, oh yeah ... it was just TODAY we saw that Azure exploit providing full cross-tenant compromise.
A big part of why European companies are turning away from American companies is the sort of MAGA bullshit you just demonstrated.
Oh wait.