Nicholas Carlini has a good talk about the risks on his homepage https://nicholas.carlini.com/ (can't link to the talk directly for some reason)
If you've got a lot of roving bandits with fancy lockpicks, you're village needs to harden the walls, reduce the number of entry points, identify and document entrants more universally, check under more carriages and inside more trunks for stowaways, etc. And with all that comes delays, imprivacy, accusations, false positives.
The low trust world that we're headed towards isn't going to be nearly as fun.
The advice today is the same as it has ever been, though. Always assume that any networked computer is or may become compromised. Do not do anything critical on a networked computer, because it is or may become compromised. You can still use computers, but assume that a bad actor may take control at any time, and plan for that eventuality.
For example, if you are hooking up a networked computer to your town's water supply system, ask yourself "what would happen if Iran got complete control of this system?" If you're putting your school system's students' mental health data into a networked computer, ask yourself "what would happen if all of this data became public?"
For now most of these appear to be related to supply chain attacks which can be avoided with basic discipline and using features that browsers had for years: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Defens...
If it changes and the hash no longer matches perhaps due customer changing config then the site is faced with the challenge of either the browser refusing to load the script (with potential breakage) or reporting the change which then is probably ignored
It's not really a simple fix for the way the web is built today
Wired's coverage (25 points) https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50296328
WSJ's coverage (20 points) https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50294287