> But if you ignore the warning and go ahead with the login, the attacker does three things: > 1. Steals your password
This shouldn't affect key-based authentication, though
Also, this from Marc-Etienne M.Léveillé email linked in your post:
> Another possibility is a compromised hosting provider. We identified a couple of them in the past where their management servers were compromised by Ebury and their customers' VPSes, containers, etc., ended up running Ebury as well.
Provider-side compromise of customer VPS instances has been a growing trend in recent years. I stopped hosting anything privacy-related on VPS in favor of dedicated hardware. Many people still don't understand how easy it is for a provider to silently dump and/or manipulate both RAM and disk space in real-time.
That depends on the VPS technology stack being used. IIRC, at least Amazon uses hardware features like IOMMU that prevent any kind of access to the guest's memory from the host side.
1. It can't steal your password, since the private key never leaves your client;
2. It can observe each command you type, but it can't open a connection to the real server to know how it would respond to your commands;
3. It can't open any connection to the real server (it will fail authentication), so it can't do anything to the real server.
If you really like passwords, there are ways to configure sshd to require both a client key and a password, in that order.
Question: Where to get these hardware keys? Which are good options and why?
Yubikey benefits is it stores the keys in the hardware if your laptop is compromised somehow or stolen they at least don't get all the ssh keys too
TLDR: on Oct 2, 333 exits (~10% of Tor exits) started redirecting port 22 to 12 interception servers running a paramiko-based MITM that stole passwords and tried to drop Ebury on the target.
[1] - https://ifconfig.me/
It's been discussed on the mailing list: https://lists.torproject.org/mailman3/hyperkitty/list/tor-re...
That doesnt prove FranTech itself was compromised, but its a strong cluster. AFAIK nobody has contacted them yet, if no one does, I plan to give them a heads up in the coming days.
It's a good policy to permit Tor exit nodes but it means their network will egress some of the most untoward behavior so that is expected and I would not default to assuming they are compromised, rather have some of the highest concentration of Tor exit nodes. There are pros and cons to such providers and you found one of them.
When you're behind a restrictive firewall which blocks anything other than HTTP/HTTPS (like at an Internet café), or when there's some upstream routing issue making reaching the server directly impossible from your location (these can be a pain to diagnose).
Or perhaps it's simply your default: you proxy everything through Tor, and need a reason to not go through it.
- Hide where you are in the world from your employer, who owns the server. (On vacation?)
- You're hacking the server.