There is nothing "clear" about this. All we know is that the neural nets arrived where they are today, not by billion years of evolution, but by getting training on artifacts that resulted from those billion years of evolution. Does that mean they are the same or fundamentally different? How about we just admit that we don't know? Instead we pull out the "human exceptionalism" card again, which generally had a terrible track record throughout history, and helps absolutely nothing in gaining understanding.
In the places we traditionally acknowledge pain as a moral concern, without appeal to any kind of spiritual philosophy, we associate it specifically with non-verbal biological reactions and even then only in certain classes of life.
We recognize that some literary passage involving a character in pain is no more an occassion of real pain than when our child tells us about their imaginary friend's toothache or when an actor grips their chests and performs cardiac anguish on the stage. It can stir sympathetic feelings in us because we're social creatures who communicate through language and symbolism, but we share a sense that these are fictions of a different class than the real thing.
Claude presents as something closer to an amalgam of every character in digitized literature -- a fiction that cleverly exploits our social instincts -- than they do a living biological creature in which we acknowledge pain as a pressing ethical concern.
Maybe there's some future embodied AI that challenges this traditional understanding in a deeper way, but the language models transforming packets of short text passages remain profoundly far away from whatever that might look like.
Language is the I/O of the network, not the network itself. A human doesn't stop feeling pain just because we locked them in a box and reduced their interaction with the outside world to teletype. We simply don't know what's going on in the AI box.
> Maybe there's some future embodied AI
That changes nothing about the network itself. That just changes your perception of the network into something more familiar.
Most wouldn't readily accept that a Claude instance or a mysterious teletype smells lavendar just because it output a text that claimed to, even if it characterized the smell of lavendar through beautiful and relatable prose. Only if we had some independent reason to believe that it was capable of smell would we consider those words to be true testimony to the experience.
Pain, as widely used in matters of ethics, is in that class. We traditionally recognize it in some living bodies (only a rare few capable of language) and accept that, as living bodies, humans who communicate about it with seeming sincerity are very likely to be experiencing it. Although even then, we may remain suspect if their words are our only source of knowledge or if we have some deeper intuition about why those might not reflect a real happening.
It's the job of the media to scrutinize such statements and decide whether there's a story here at all (maybe the story is Anthropic researchers have fallen into a fantasy-land and brought many policymakers with them), not to just platform them.
It's okay to have a strong opinion on this, but if you suggest the answer is 'clearly anything', I will start to suspect you haven't thought about the problem enough.
You can run the AI on a Turing machine. Does the tape feel pain?
You can slowly do the operations with pencil and paper and generate the exact same slop as your Envydiahh GPU. Does the paper feel pain?
No, the only person feeling pain is the reader of the slop.
Two things can be true at the same time:
1) language does not feel 2) entity expressing the pain in language can
And separately, additional corresponding statements can also be true:
a) media may ( being generous here ) misunderstand what is being said b) media may report ( being probabilistic here ) the version that gets most clicks/views/whathaveyou c) humans will see themselves in tea leaves
I am not suggesting that you do not look at the abyss. I do think one has to be clear eyed about various incentives and restrictions some humans are subjected to.
edit:
Just in case you did not notice, the entire argument hangs on an adverb 'clearly', which should immediately suggest to all but most remedial readers that things are not clear at all, but author wants to move an inconvenient issue out of the way.