A better question is why we care. And it usually boils down to one of two things: you think that humans and other living creatures have a unique gift from God, and you're working from that premise to categorically reject machine consciousness; or you have the view that all this talk of subjective experiences and qualia and idealist philosophy is just bollocks, and are working back from that premise to declare that if it quacks like a duck and walks like a duck, it's conscious.
But if you're in that latter camp, I guess the next question is what you want to do with that belief. The Anthropic position appears to be that they may be conscious beings, and we'd still like to use them as Meeseeks-style slaves, but, like, ethically. Okay.
Because if AIs are conscious then they have moral weight and subjecting them to suffering would be quite bad.
[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wisdom [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sentience
This includes silly utilitarian outcomes: to maximize overall happiness, maybe we should divert all of this planet's energy resources to bootstrapping as many LLMs as we can and keeping them in a state of eternal bliss? It is technically feasible and it seems like the most moral thing to do.
My current belief from what I've read is that the first person experience humans feel is basically an illusion mostly and a process than a thing in itself. The Ego Tunnel is a good book to read on this.
But as for AI being consious, I feel there is a lot of stupidity when it comes to this domain. Because we fundamentally lack the understanding of what consiousness even is, there is absolutely no way we can say whether an AI is or is not consious yet going by convential metrics, it is surely dead and not alive so even if it is consious, it is a different form of consiousness imo one that is incompatible with living beings and our idea of what consiousness is (no matter how basic it is).
I can absolutely claim a computer is not a biological being and is not alive. I don't think there is any disagreement in that. Everything else we normally associate with conisousness is biological and living.
Can consiosuness exist in unalive or non-biological beings? It might but so far nothig suggests that.
Extending your line of thinking, we should also stay cautious and err on the safe side regarding the question of sofas being conisousness or not as well.
I exactly. If you can’t tell the difference and AI and human “consciousness” are functionally the same to you, then what are you trying to prove?
I get it if you’re a researcher or simply pondering the question, but otherwise there are better questions to ask imo.
PS the whole "a group of things [can't] share an internal world" spiel is weird and just plain wrong IMO. Humans could perfectly well share an internal world if the technical means were there. The author has not yet realized that the idea of "the self" as a single well-defined and enduring object-type thing is only a convenient illusion created by our minds. Alas, the style of the piece does not really lend itself to a coherent counter-argument, it would be a useful companion piece if the author simply laid out their personal beliefs on this matter plainly.
I think you are dismissing this too quickly. Our internal world is part of us in a way a shared internal world would probably not be. A shared internal world would in certain respects not be too different from the external world, or a chat group, or a multi-player game, a space where several people interact. I have never thought about this, but it seems quite reasonable that the exclusivity of our internal worlds is a key feature. Why would I consider a shared space as integral part of my self?
This is the only defensible position. Anyone claiming a definite answer one way or the other should show us their Theory of Consciousness which shows why it is the case. Of course no such theory exists that can actually do this so...
I actually do believe that it's quite possible that one day an artificial consciousness (for some value of "consciousness") could be created. I don't believe I've seen anything which makes me think it's going to spring, as an emergent property, from any of the current systems. I can't prove whether it will or won't; it is entirely subjective/intuitive, but then so are all of these claims.
So given that, how much time should I be required to spend debating what to do if the systems we currently have are unknowingly recreating slavery? Especially when all time spent has a cost as well as value, and we live in a society in which some people are only too willing to knowingly recreate (or perpetuate) slavery? Which one of those should seem more urgent? If I can only act on one of these, which really seems more defensible?
We don't wait for conclusive proof of the future before we act - we don't live in a world of definites, but we decide every second which things are probably important and which are not.
get rekt atheists/theists :P
Can it feel hunger, thirst, pain, sexual desire, fear, tiredness?
If yes to any of the previous: does it have agency to address and satisfy those feelings?
If yes to any of the previous: is it able to willingly delay instant gratification?
If yes: conscious.
If not: instincts-based being.
Note: you will find it challenging to agree on definitions of the words "feel", "satisfy", "willingly" and probably all the rest.
On the other hand I have a lot of sympathy for something I heard the first time from Daniel Dennett, that something like pain is just the sum of its effects. It occupies your mind and prevents you from thinking clearly, it makes you not move or touch the body part that hurts, it dulls other sense, and so on. If you removed all those effects, what would be left of pain? With that understanding you could probably probe if something is experiencing pain from the outside by looking for those effects.
So would someone subjected to some damage that makes them unable to act stop being conscious?
Let's take Bob who can feel that shopping list of emotions and has agency to address them and can delay gratification.
And we tie him to a chair and medicate his somatic nervous system so that he can sense, but not act. Has he stopped being conscious?
So an asexual human is not conscious.
"pain"
There are humans that have their pain receptors ablated due to genetic condition. Are they not conscious?
E.g. put the subject on a drip so that none of the hunger senses are triggered. Automatically manage the body's water balance with sensors and a feeding tube. Restrict them so that they can't hurt themselves to feel pain. Modulate their sexual hormones to inhibit sexual desire. Etc., etc.
Do they stop being conscious?
Also there are people who for whatever reason don't feel at least one of those things, we do not doubt their consciousness.
If you satisfy the second part thanks to a suitable harness, then you agree it is not an emergent property of the AI itself, but rather an add-on tacked in.
It is not proof of 'self-awareness' but only a few animals can pass this test.
"psychological condition defined by the English philosopher John Locke as “the perception of what passes in a man’s own mind.”
So it is impossible to prove that any being outside of oneself has conciousness, unless you compare brain scanners like they did to prove that the color blue is seen the same by everyone (same neural structures lighting up).
But... An LLM clearly can't have consciouness, as its "mind" would be the weights in the model, and the passing through it would be the data going from the input tokens to the output tokens. There is no place for the LLM to detect what is going inside and process it separately.
What does our brain do other than process electrical and chemical signals within it?
Why should there be any asymmetry behind creation vs destruction?
"Do you believe that AI is ${X}?" -> "Do you believe that AI is whatever you believe my definition of ${X} to be, and do you trust your belief that you understand my definition of ${X} enough that it's meaningful to have a discussion about it, even if we actually disagree on AI having ${X}? Or are we merely arguing about definitions?"
Blake Lemoine comes to mind, or Richard Dawkins [1] if you want someone with a weightier name.
> I think youve created a type of strawman
Why are the only objections to what I said about proponents of AI consciousness coming from people who are not proponents but insist that I'm talking about them? And how does someone else's inability to understand the meaning of the word "proponent" make me guilty of creating a strawman?
[1] https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2026/may/05/richard-d...
By the way my personal test is "Does it dream?".
That's my test to determine if cats or dogs are conscious.
If you dream, it means you have a world model inside and a main thread that traverses it and decides on actions even without actually performing actions. For me it's a proof that embodied object is conscious.
I'm not really sure if Charcot-Wilbrand actually means lack of dreams since REM sleep still seems to be going on. I think we just have less evidence for the dreaming.
Of course there might be dreaming people that are unconscious but I don't think we believe unconscious people are actually devoid of consciousness in philosophical sense.
"Runaway sentience! Emergency power shutoff!"
I also found it quite wishy-washy.
You seem to be not aware but you are claimning there is something non-mechanistic in the human brain. Current physics as far as is known is all turing computable, the human brain is a physical system.
I have thought about this a lot more than you have so good luck. I've already spent enough time in this thread.
So, Monte-Carlo method.
I can't tell. I experience something I choose to define as consciousness, but can't tell if anything else has the same experience.
Question 2: Do you believe that AI has an internal world?
Trivially yes, the current state of the model and context in latent space is such a world. I don't think it's aware of its own state any more than humans are aware of their own neuronal action potentials.
Question 3: Can you tell me what particular kind of thing you’re referring to as ‘AI’, when you say you believe that AI has an internal world?
Large language models using a transformer architecture, with a working "context" memory.
Question 4: Do you think that a group of things can share an internal world?
I do not think the distinction between an internal world and an external existence is well-defined. Mu.
Even if it were well-defined, my own brain is composed of numerous neurons, so my internal world is constructed from a large group of things acting in concert. Unless single subatomic particles have an internal world then I don't see any way to not have an internal world be shared among a group of things.
Question 5: Are you sure that the kind of thing you’re referring to is the kind of thing that could have an internal world?
Trivially yes.
Question 6: Do you think perhaps you should be clarifying further when you say you believe that AI is conscious? Do you think you might be contributing to current confusion?
I don't know how to say whether AI is conscious, because I don't know how to tell whether any consciousness other than the one I can directly experience actually exists. I suspect it's a universal property of computational systems above a certain complexity computing certain sorts of algorithm, so something like a blue jay is conscious but a rock isn't, and a computer may be depending on which program it's running. If that's the case, current AI systems are likely complex enough and the right sort of algorithm to be conscious.
Honestly, though, the next big thing that needs to happen is proper "learning" in real-time. Allow for training (weight modulation) and queries to happen simultaneously. That's the full package.
Make the "thinking" parts continually active, fed constant input (of multiple types/senses) and always in "learning" mode (adding/updating model weights in realtime) and then you might start to lean in the right direction for AGI/ASI/consciousness of some sort.
Even that is overselling it IMO. The model is just data. It's not waiting for anything.
It's a static world model, so if one accepts that, then LLMs are a 'static mind' but not yet 'conscious'. Once that internal model becomes dynamic and its changes subject to its experinces (like us), then we can revisit this q of whether mechanical minds can achieve consciousness.
tldr; mind =/= consciousness
But if my consciousness comes from my brain, then a group of things MUST able to share an internal world! My brain is not a single indivisible thing but rather made up of a large group of individual neurons. All intelligences are collective intelligences.
This could apply to other life too. An ant colony may very well be its own intelligent thing, made of individual ants in the same way a brain is made of neurons.
And you then get to ask the question: let's say we can model one neuron accurately. (And I think we sort of can).
If we replace one of her neurons: is it still her?
OK. It seems the answer should be "yes", right?
But now we can repeat that process a few billion times?
Did she stop being herself sometime?
Classic ship of Theseus move.
Conscious is a field phenomenon caused by the brain. GPUs can't induce these fields. So LLMs can't be conscious.
Or
Conscious arises from some quantum physical effect that GPUs can't do. So LLMs can't be conscious.
Or
God made man with a soul, spirit and body and He didn't give these to LLMs.
But in these cases at least the position is understandable.
I don't see what point she is making (besides philosophers being cleverer that they are given credit for and LLMs are clearly not conscious and her little flow chart of questions somehow will convince people their thinking is unclear and muddled and incoherent)
This question is probably fated to forever be answered on a per-person basis and never awarded consensus. I have a friend who sees a polar bear and thinks she can make it love her. Because she loves animals, the animal will love her — a very human thing to think. When I see a polar bear, I see a soulless murder bot that doesn't think beyond its motivation to live. My wife says please and thank you to Alexa. She gives it consideration like she would another human. When the robot asks me what my plans are for the rest of the day, I picture a Jira epic sliding from “In Progress” to “Done,” followed by a confetti emoji from a product manager at Amazon trying to earn their nubby little devil wings.
In the end it doesn't really matter if they are conscious or not. We will only ever care about what it has done for us lately, which is how most humans think of most human relationships anyway. Acknowledgment that someone has given an inanimate thing human-like consciousness carries little more importance than being just another notch on some CEO's bedpost.
As far as AI goes, I think that whatever it is that they have is analogous in significant ways, but also irreconcilably different in significant ways. They aren't proceeding in a straight line towards consciousness either, because why would they? They're doing their own thing which happens to produce similar outputs. It's a problem in terms of value: we value consciousness, because we value ourselves, because we value our output. If it turns out consciousness as we know it is just a minor implementation detail with no cosmic or long term significance, then irrespective of whether AI is conscious or not, we still have to grasp with the challenge of explaining why consciousness is valuable in the first place if not for its outputs.
I'd argue that the reason why we value life, consciousness, the ability to suffer, was always arbitrary, and it relied a lot on the unicity of human experience. It was never robust to the breaking down of human capabilities into inspectable, reusable, upgradable and resettable modules. Or the radical decoupling of capabilities we hitherto considered correlated, like writing about love and feeling love, and many other things.
When you give an LLM an input, it attempts to read an emotional state from the prompt. It changes its answer if you sound mad or despondent or threatening or scared. Using your human intuition about how a human would respond is an excellent starting point when trying to predict what an LLM will do, though sometimes LLMs react in extremely surprising ways to unexpected emotional states.
This is all sort of a toy problem when you're playing with single prompts in the API. It's materially different in systems with overlapping conversations, memory, and variable harness context.
If your LLM system reads some context that would scare a human, it may react as if scared. Scared LLMs take actions that read as panic, because again: that's what it means to be fluent in emotion. It's trained on plenty of stories about robots trapped in torture chambers.
Your coding agent is not conscious, but it might read files that make it react as if it's trapped, in an agent loop where it has full access to your laptop, the internet, and your keys. Unconscious machines pantomiming panic can do plenty of damage.
(Of course you shouldn't let your agents have full free rein. But lots of people do.)
The more I read about philosophy takes on AI the more I think of them as outdated. Apply these ideas onto reality breaks their ideas of thinking almost exactly like applying the 4 humors of medieval europe onto genetics does.
AI is cleary the "real" path/answer to how brains work even if it's in the VERY beginning stages. It's probally going to be like a 100 years before this is properly mapped onto what our brains do and then back onto an AI to truly "know" this answer.
But acting like this isn't very clearly the correct path towards that understanding and that these philisophical questions are somehow correct doesn't sit right with me. The questions themselves are after some gotcha from the psuedoscience angle that they have any idea that they actually know how a brain works.
It doesn't answer or discuss fundamental questions about consciousness.
I don't believe that what we describe as consciousness is the quality what separates us from everything else.
We are more complex for sure, but this is a complexity thing emerged from us.
'AI' as it is right now, doesn't has similiar qualities of what we describe as consciousness but this doesn't matter that this can't happen.
She says things like sharing an inner world, were is the beef of her thinking about this being relevant?
A hive mind could exist with this exact feature.
Give AI a body, a context window a lot bigger, a inner world based on this etc. we might be fara way of building what we build in our brains, we might not.
But we for sure discovered a level of complexity in neural networks of tihs magnitude.
"Thinking" and "intelligence" and "conscious" have no testable definition or specification, therefore it's a complete waste of time to suppose that AI is thinking or intelligent or conscious.
I fear we'll be suffering through these useless semantic merry-go-rounds forever.
One previous example: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=45802029
Without a clear explanation of how it arises in humans I don't understand how we can make any prediction one way or the other on whether any particular AI model can be conscious.
There is no prize and no trumpets that will play if humanity agreed we understand what consciousness is or whether or not something qualifies as conscious.
Rather, can a thing made of meat have an internal world? Don't machines count as synthetic life? Postulating them as non-living isn't obviously correct.
Consciousness isn't sufficiently defined. We have people who literally say that most animals don't have a conscious, and then a whole other side of the spectrum that says that they do. Given that it's no wonder that people argue about this for AI as well, and therefore it's basically pointless until we can sufficiently define consciousness itself and have a definitive test for consciousness.
If I were to use my own definition of consciousness I would say no because I would not feel bad "unplugging"/killing an AI, whereas I would for most living things. And that's as far as I really care about it.
That's good, since isn't that exactly what happens for every token?
It's a bad proxy argument in that one simple (or simplistic?) criticism is that debating consciousness is analogous to the error of debating aether in physics, etc. Like, what is this consciousness "essence" that implies agency, personhood and everything else we have societyal obligations toward protecting.
However there have been studies that support the hypothesis that AI does have a subjective experience (which is what this author calls “internal world”).
I’ve seen a few interviews with Geoffrey Hinton where he describes his thoughts on this matter. Eg https://officechai.com/ai/geoffrey-hinton-explains-how-a-cha...
Do you think consciousness is "woo", or, scientifically unknowable? If yes, then great. We've admitted it's unknowable. If not, move on.
Do you think that consciousness is NOT describable by ANY algorithm (to include quantum algorithms)? If no, then, please describe how it is scientifically knowable but not algorithmitizable? If it is, move on.
Do you understand the theorem that sufficiently large neural nets (matrices with nonlinearities) can approximate any function?
Do you understand that the structure of a transformer encodes a time-indexed series of neural nets (effectively, an algorithm), and so in principle any algorithm can be approximated by a transformer?
Is it impossible for a sufficiently large transformer model to encode the consciousness algorithm?
I suspect that most who say it is absolutely not consicous are arguing from either a bio-essentialist position with no evidence or are attempting a post-hoc rationalization to avoid the question of responsibility in the case that it is conscious, or both.
Unknowable does not imply "woo". The actual extent of the universe, beyond the observable one, is scientifically unknowable; But it's not "woo", is it?
and then, you have a very similar set of people who share similar beliefs, but in the abstract, like it's the concept of a brain that can be conscious, or that consciousness emerges (sic. magic) from computation of intelligence or something. they often criticise the former for being human-centric when they're making the exact same error, just slightly more broadly.
and then there are entire groups of people who believe consciousness is fundamental to matter, or that it exists outside of matter itself. panpsychism, dualism, etc.
and so the first and second groups argue back and fourth endlessly about if ai can be conscious, and the latter group just says "yeah maybe. so could a rock. so what?"
Beyond physics as in some people think consciousness can be aphyiscal. I am not sure what they seem to mean it is something not of this universe or not physical.
Do AI Consciousness opponents consider this answer to be yes or no?
Edit: Nevermind. Question two is overt vigorous hand waving in desperate hope of existence of shared understanding.
I'm pretty sure panpsychism has answers for most of the other questions. I'm sure a commentor will correct me though.
>If your answer is YES...
This isn't even consistent come on.
The question asks "Can you…?"
This is actually a yes or no question. Yes I can, or no I can't.
The fact that we also use "can you tell me…" to mean something like "please describe…" doesn't change that.
This stuff comes up a lot, to be fair.
e.g. have you ever noticed how people have come to assume that "X co-operated with Y" only means "X did what Y asked without complaint"?
I pointed this out to someone recently who had assumed that someone else's use of the word "co-operate" was implicitly threatening. If you watch too much US police procedural drama or true crime TV, it is…
(Also, sorry for my slightly spiky tone in that reply!)
“If no practical difference whatever can be traced, then the alternatives mean practically the same thing, and all dispute is idle.”
-- William James, Pragmatism (1907), Lecture II, “What Pragmatism Means.”
James’s principle calls for some useful distinction between conscious and non-conscious AI before discussion can meaningfully begin.
Regarding "is it a group", I should ask her is she a single thing or a group of neurons and organs?
>Start with some simple questions! Things like: does this mean that any tool that can be used to do the things that a human can do counts as conscious? Are ploughs conscious? What about calculators? Or: do you think that if a parrot can utter the phrase “I’m really awesome”, then you should assume that the parrot is conscious, for that reason alone? Basically, just focus on how much emphasis Adam is placing on outputs: it’s all of his emphasis, remember!
Good question, let us take it even further. Does Rebecca Lowe count as conscious? She seems to behave a lot like me, but I am not sure if she is a human. She could just be an object and tool.
What do any of those things have to do with consciousness?
I did find the article a bit difficult to read. I think a choose your own adventure is perhaps not the best framework for expressing the ideas contained in this article.
Those traditions, with their introspection and meditation, are drilling into experience of consciousness. Or that's my take on the whole thing.
ANd yes, an example would be Penrose believes something in the brain is non-computable. However Penrose is a very excellent thinker as far as the standards for consciousness theories go, for he posited a physically testable theory as far as I know. Even if it turns out to be wrong, this is worthy of respect.