Keys Not Included: recovering the signing keys for US driver's license barcodes(ryan.science)
120 pointsby Ryan54534 hours ago13 comments
  • bzmrgonz3 hours ago
    It baffles that people think it's a bad thing to disclose a public key. That's their purpose actually. Sure we now have the post quantum computer threat, and some state actors are harvesting keys, but quantum computer is going to disrupt so much, that Id verification won't even matter really.
    • remix2000a minute ago
      I think it depends on the context? It's in an ID card's design goals to be provably valid, so it's pointless to not publish its public keys, but something like SSH pubkeys, uhh, should I really be so eager to just publicly dump all of mine…?
    • morschan hour ago
      Think about it, the key analogy is just terrible. In the origin domain, losing a key is always bad, and making a key available to all is a non sequitur.

      It's not like non-technical people understand asymmetric cryptography. Or even technical people, for that matter.

      Maybe we should refer to the public key as an address, and the private key is just a password again. You can send stuff, securely, to an address. And you can verify the sender when you have their address (ie check the signature).

      • fc417fc802an hour ago
        The key analogy is perfect for the private key and for symmetric keys. Publishing those is always bad and means you need to rekey immediately just like losing a traditional physical key to a secure building would.

        The public counterpart is tricky to name but I think attaching "public" to it makes the intended usage plenty clear. There isn't really a physical counterpart unless you consider maybe those machines that check for counterfeit cash but even that's not a great fit because the pubkey is simultaneously analogous to a lock box.

      • SilasX43 minutes ago
        Yeah, that always bothered me about the terminology. My fix would be to call it a lock -- everyone understands that you can share those and it doesn't make them any easier to open.
        • morsch32 minutes ago
          That analogy works for encryption but doesn't really work for signature verification
      • fragmedean hour ago
        Or how about we call it the lock. There's the (private) key, and it fits the lock (public key). You can pass the lock around, but you need the (private) key to be useful.
    • altairprime29 minutes ago
      That implies they chose not to. More likely the other states simply didn’t realize the value derived from paying a vendor to enable a ‘feature’, not realizing both the necessity of such signatures and that the cost to the vendor and mechanism of delivery is precisely the same regardless. One might consider what sort of pressures a citizen could apply to compel those states to act more to their own benefit, but I have no specific ideas to suggest at this time.
    • what2 hours ago
      Where did you get the impression the author thinks it’s a bad thing? From the article:

      > These are public keys, which are meant to be published - recovering one lets anyone check a signature, not forge one.

      • isomorphican hour ago
        I think GP and TFA mean that some of the states are afraid of public-key disclosure.
        • prophesian hour ago
          TFA is a bit obtuse about it, and assumes you've read their previous article on the topic, but from what I gathered, it's about whether the AAMVA would standardize cryptographically signing the barcodes of driver licenses to mitigate creating fakes in the US/CA. Cali showed it's entirely possible, but there's still no pressure for the standard to change across the board.
    • cuoderan hour ago
      its even called "public" lol
  • domhan hour ago
    This is such a better design than whatever the UK is trying to do[1]. Why make a 3rd party app a requirement for this? I will never install such an app, especially one not made by the government itself.

    [1]: https://www.dailystar.co.uk/news/latest-news/digital-id-upda...

  • KingMachiavelli3 hours ago
    All of this is nearly pointless unless the photo itself is in the barcode and also signed. You only need a leak of a few hundred real IDs to cover all of the identifiable characteristics (hair, eye, skin color, approx height and weight). Leak a few hundred thousand a year and now you can’t even flag leaked IDs without some false positives.

    A fake photo plus a valid barcode will pass any current check right? Unless you still do a secondary proprietary photo lookup that I don’t think exists.

    • lxgr10 minutes ago
      The Austrian ID card does that. It’s a really blurry black-and-white photo only, but it’s still recognizable and I find it quite impressive that any type of photo (in addition to its public key signature) can fit into a QR code at all.
    • crote39 minutes ago
      And it's a classic case of Not Invented Here as well: this problem was solved decades ago and the solution is widely-deployed in passports and most European identity documents - just use NFC!

      Cryptographic NFC chips are basically free these days, and any modern smartphone can read them. The photo issue is solved by having the chip contain a copy of the photo, as a few extra kilobytes of data isn't an issue when you aren't using barcodes. The copy issue is solved by having the chip sign a verifier-provided nonce together with the data, and having the government sign the chip's public key instead.

      • lxgr7 minutes ago
        Biometric passports, including US ones, have supported the same protocol for decades at this point.
    • kccqzy2 hours ago
      I wonder if we might have the equivalent of Certificate Revocation List for IDs leaked this way.
  • samsullivanan hour ago
    Should credit the authors of the Verifiable Credential library. The vendor isnt the one to credit here.

    Digital verification is going to matter a lot more for objects we own rather than the objects that proxy for that (currently the main function of an ID). Identity fraud is only problematic because ownership is tied to a loose record of SIN/DL.

    Having a physical medium represent ownership just shifts the burden to the state and allows for social engineering and fraud to persist.

  • RockRobotRock3 hours ago
    I had a fake ID, and it being scannable was a huge selling point. Convenience stores all scan, and don't seem to care if you look underage. I was only turned down two or three times, usually at bars and restaurants.
    • anon_cow1111an hour ago
      The first thing I do with a real ID is widen the reference bars on the sides so the checkout scanner can't read it. If they want my birthday they can type it in manually, I don't need all my info in some store database.
      • anon29111 minutes ago
        Defacing a photo Id(driver's license or passport) is technically a crime.
        • mitxela8 minutes ago
          The optimal level of crime is not zero.
    • NDlurker3 hours ago
      The other thing I remember was California fakes folding in half and not breaking
      • wildzzz2 hours ago
        The flex of the plastic is always a good way to check. Although I've held a fake NY ID and a legit one at the same time and could not tell any difference. Even did a double blind test.
        • CSSer2 hours ago
          Weirdly when I first got my California DL I thought it felt fake compared to my home state because it was so much thinner. Maybe it’s better for the environment.
      • RockRobotRock2 hours ago
        [dead]
  • jsejcksnan hour ago
    Ryan: The style of your blog is easy to read except for the pixelated monospace font. Thanks for sharing this post!
  • jmathai3 hours ago
    I come to HN to learn things I never realized I wanted to know.
  • simoncion3 hours ago
    At the time of this writing, the subtitle of the submission here on HN is

      recovering the signing keys for US driver's license barcodes
    Notably, this subtitle doesn't appear on the blog post.

    Anyway. I only see claims that the public key can be determined from license barcodes, not that a signing key can be determined. What am I missing or misunderstanding?

    To head off one potential retort: While it's true that one can use a public key to encrypt data for the recipient that has the private half of that key or verify that data has been signed by the possessor of the private half of that key, I'm almost 100% certain that it's not possible to use that public key to sign data would validate to other folks as being signed by the private half of that key. It has been more than a decade since I've thought about any of this, but isn't the entire point of public-key cryptography that the public part can be distributed to your worst enemy without causing you any trouble at all?

    • trollbridge3 hours ago
      Yes. The subtitle is wrong. He recovers the public key, due to the way EDCSA signing works.
    • kccqzy3 hours ago
      Yup. The person who submitted this to HN is probably way less knowledgeable on this topic than the writer of the article. The article clearly labels the recovered keys as “recovered public keys” at the top.
      • otterley3 hours ago
        Given the poster's nickname, the person who posted it and the author may be one and the same.
        • kccqzy3 hours ago
          I think the author is Claude.
  • piratejon3 hours ago
    That's really neat! Seems potentially adaptable to paper currency--a verifiable QR code digital signature of the bill's serial number creates a cryptographically hard obstacle to counterfeiting!
    • lxgr3 minutes ago
      It’s a bunch of static signed data, which is hard to modify but trivial to copy. Not exactly what you’d want for bank notes.

      NFC and a challenge-response protocol could work, though, like e.g. the one used in biometric passports.

    • kqp3 hours ago
      Copy known good serial number + signature.
      • teravor2 hours ago
        combine with a central authority server network and make it blind signatures and you have untraceable e-cash.
        • mitxela7 minutes ago
          No government wants untraceable e-cash. They want it fully traceable.
  • EPWN3D3 hours ago
    > Before signing, the encoder fills the field with a placeholder (0), repeated for the field's exact length - signs the entire payload including that placeholder, and then writes the real signature over the top of it. To verify, you put the placeholder back.

    I hate shit like this. Do not let your crypto layer know about the structure of what it's signing. Keep security stupid.

    • woodruffw2 hours ago
      As far as compact encodings go, this kind of patch-and-fill technique isn't particularly egregious. The alternative mentioned (where the verifier has to be aware of a bitfield that defines the to-be-signed elements) is much easier to mess up!
    • lazide2 hours ago
      Counterpoint - every real world crypto algo needs to do somewhat content aware padding or the crypto is much easier to break. Either that, or go so overboard on randomness that it adds a lot of overhead.

      When you look at the details underneath more crypto, there is a lot of ah hah - and ‘doh’ - moments due to implementation realities.

  • davemultifactoran hour ago
    this is cool
  • samlinnfer2 hours ago
    [dead]