I hope we see a different CA for each ccTLD in the future.
Completely agree with this and IMO it's how the system should've operated from the very start. Unfortunately, I highly doubt that the CA cartel will let go of the power (and associated cash flow) voluntarily.
Surely this will improve user security and trust in the existing Web PKI system in non-Western countries. /s
I recognize that Russia is making this change for MitM spying, but this particular sarcasm seems incorrect. Given Verisign's willingness to bend the knee to Texas courts, one could reasonably lose faith in US PKI issuers such as Digicert. I certainly hope the EU is studying the problem US-controlled EU-trusted issuers — the EU age verification systems hinge critically on them, much less the entire web. So I empathize with the sarcasm, but best not to offer MitM proponents (whether in Russia or the U.S. or elsewhere!) an argument that could be used against your viewpoint.
Nope, they do it primarily out of necessity, because of the mounting pressure on the previously used CAs. The MitM capability is just a nice side bonus.
>So I empathize with the sarcasm, but best not to offer MitM proponents (whether in Russia or the U.S. or elsewhere!) an argument that could be used against your viewpoint.
If browsers truly cared about user security they would've provided reasonable conditions for supporting national CAs:
- Limit its authority only to respective national domain zones.
- Mandate use of Certificate Transparency handled by an independent third party to prevent MitM.
But this debacle only shows that western-controlled (especially financial) systems can be and will be used as a pressure tool, so any large sovereign nation will not trust them as they would in the past. And the taken actions only contribute to further fragmentation of the Internet across national and block borders.
Not really, banks do this. FSB would love to spy on everyone of course, but all was working fine until the CAs started revoking the certificates recently, directly aiding the FSB. From the article:
>The banks first moved to GlobalSign in 2022. This June, GlobalSign began revoking certificates held by sanctioned Russian companies, and they moved on to HARICA, the Greek academic authority.
>A month ago, HARICA refused to revoke: its issuance is self-service and domain-validated, so its certificates identify a domain and nothing else; it was not, it argued, “the competent authority to make these legal attributions.” However, on July 27, Greece’s eIDAS supervisory body appeared to confirm the disputed certificates had been revoked and referred the case to the national financial sanctions unit.
That’s a wild move by a bank. How is the place not overrun with scams?
Decentralised systems such as ssh are different, but I find it hard to imagine trusted central authorities ending up as anything other than states, or so heavily regulated as to be effectively state be controlled. This wax always the big flaw in SSL/TLS. In DNS too.