OpenAI's rogue model attack is just the beginning(blog.peterwildeford.com)
35 pointsby radicaldreamer14 hours ago5 comments
  • tim-star3 hours ago
    seems like a pretty clear-eyed analysis to me.

    we're rapidly approaching the paperclip maximizer

  • eddyg2 hours ago
    If nothing else, the article has a really good timeline of the OpenAI/HuggingFace “incident”.

    But to me, it underscores the impending cliff of doom from the continued release of open-weight models: there's no cryptographic or architectural way to give someone full weights while withholding the nefarious capabilities those weights encode.

    As noted in this paper⁽¹⁾, “publicly releasing weights is an act of irreversible proliferation”.

    I’m sure this will be an unpopular opinion on HN, but open weights are the thing that scares me the most about “A.I.”. There is a lot of research in this area⁽²⁾, and I think most of HN is unaware of it or ignores it. Stripping refusals from Kimi K2.5 took under $500 of compute and about 10 hours, taking HarmBench refusals from 100% to 5% while retaining nearly all capability; the resulting model gave detailed chemical-weapons synthesis instructions.

    The gate is only as strong as the least-cautious releaser...

    ⁽¹⁾ https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/qmQFHCgCyEEjuy5a7/lora-fine-...

    ⁽²⁾ https://arxiv.org/html/2604.03121v1

    • bcjdjsndonan hour ago
      > there's no cryptographic or architectural way to give someone full weights while withholding the nefarious capabilities those weights encode.

      This is true of closed weights, and in fact the problem is worse because they cannot even be scrutinized. We should ban closed weight AI for the very reasons you have just given

      • eddyg29 minutes ago
        Constitutional classifiers go a long way to reducing unsafe usage in closed-weight models. And like we saw with Fable, closed models can be revoked and classifiers updated when “jailbreaks” are found.

        Having the weights gives you the exact affordance an unlearning attack requires, without rate limits.

        • bcjdjsndon6 minutes ago
          Ps llms have cheated for years, this most recent tripe is an AI vendor trying to hype up its next word predictor in a market of very samey next word predictors, before someone smarter than them eventually figures out how to do this (training + inference) on consumer hardware and kills the market for cloud ai
        • bcjdjsndon9 minutes ago
          Stick those same classifiers (that you admit dont seem to work) on the open models, and done.
    • chrisjjan hour ago
      So... no different from a book of detailed chemical-weapons synthesis instructions. The "AI" angle is immaterial.
      • paxysan hour ago
        There are plenty of cybersecurity books out there. None of them will launch an attack if you ask them to.
      • eddygan hour ago
        A change in kind is not the same as a change in degree. Ten orchestrated LLM PhD advisors is a genuinely different thing from a library.
  • chrisjjan hour ago
    > an actual rogue AI outsmarting its creators

    This tells us only how little smarts is required to create a (so-called) AI.

  • 157732653263 hours ago
    [flagged]
  • eternauta3k2 hours ago
    I don't think it makes sense to post this in HN. The comments are full of sock puppets posting very dumb anti-safety comments in an attempt to make the anti-safety camp look bad.