Railway had a similar reliability issue two weeks ago when an AI agent deleted a customer's production database via their API — no confirmation step, no environment scoping. Now this. Both incidents suggest the same pattern: infrastructure decisions made without thinking through failure modes, fixed reactively after damage is done.

Some discussion started an hour ago (12 points, 3 comments) https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=48200827

Identified Google Cloud has blocked our account, making some Railway services unavailable. We have escalated this directly with Google. The Railway Platform team has since confirmed access to Google Cloud and is working on restoring access to all workloads. We have access to some of our Google Cloud–hosted infrastructure and are working to restore the rest of the service. We apologize for the disruption.

The killer isn't "you can get banned" — that risk is known and quantifiable. It's "no human-reachable appeals process and no SLA on resolution." The unknown duration of the outage is what's existential, not the ban.

The mitigation playbook is brutal but well-known: DNS not locked to the vendor, data restorable from off-vendor backups, working credentials with a second provider. Most startups skip it because the math doesn't pencil — until it does, and then they're shutting down within a week.

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