Montgomery may possibly have been right that all the resources behind one thrust would be the best strategy. That doesn't change the fact that he wasn't going to get it. Stubbornly running an attack that needed the resources, without the resources, is not good generalship, even if you were right that the attack should have had the resources. The best you could say about that is that Montgomery was plausibly right on the larger strategic question, and was willing to waste all those lives in order to prove it. That is not remotely a positive statement.
The airborne operation was well done, even with little time to prepare? That's great. It really is. It still remains true that this is bad preparation. The troops nearly miraculously pulled it off, but commanders should not require miracles for operations to work.
This article seems to be trying too hard to spin things the other way. It is not a sober assessment; it is taking everything in the best possible light (often unwarranted).
And, I think, it would have been better for Montgomery to first fully open the port of Antwerp before trying to end-around the Germans. While he might not have needed supply via Antwerp, having such a source closer to the front would have enabled more activity to his south as well.
There was a tremendous incentive to try to end the war in 1944. There was insufficient understanding of the resilience of the German forces, and the coming logistic shortfall (or strangulation). The politics of the US/UK coalition could not be ignored. The V1/V2 sites had to be removed to end their threat to Britain, but after that was completed the targets were inland (the Ruhr and SE).
And Market Garden revealed the severe limitation of paratroop and glider infantry - it was basically static after it got to where it was going. They were not able to carry all that much with them, and there was no real ability to move except on foot.