I was expecting an ad for their product somewhere towards the end, but it wasn't there!
I do wonder though: why would this company report this vulnerability to Mozilla if their product is fingeprinting?
Isn't it better for the business (albeit unethical) to keep the vulnerability private, to differentiate from the competitors? For example, I don't see many threat actors burning their zero days through responsible disclosure!
No software wants to be fingerprinted. If it did, it would offer an API with a stable identifier. All fingerprinting is exploiting unintended behavior of the target software or hardware.
On what basis do you claim that software developers, who did not establish a means of for third parties to get a stable identifier, nevertheless intended that fingerprinting techniques should work?
1) wanting functionality that isn't provided and working around that
and
2) restoring such functionality in the face of countermeasures
The absence of functionality isn't a clear signal of intent, while countermeasures against said functionality is.
And then there is the distinction between the intent of the software publisher and the intent of the user. There is a big ethical difference between "Mozilla doesn't want advertisers tracking their users" and "those users don't want to be tracked". If these guys want to draw the line at "if there is a signal from the user that they want privacy, we won't track them", I think that's reasonable.
An example that comes to mind that I've seen is an anonymous app that allows for blocking users; you can programmatically block users, query all posts, and diff the sets to identify stable identities. However, the ability to block users is desired by the app developers; they just may not have intended this behavior, but there's no immediate solution to this. This is different than 'user_id' simply being returned in the API for no reason, which is a vulnerability. Then there's maybe a case of the user_id being returned in the API for some reason that MIGHT be important too, but that could be implemented another way more sensibly; this leans more towards vulnerability.
Ultimately most fingerprinting technologies use features that are intended behavior; Canvas/font rendering is useful for some web features (and the web target means you have to support a LOT of use cases), IP address/cookies/useragent obviously are useful, etc (though there's some case to be made about Google's pushing for these features as an advertising company!).
Unintended identification is less than ideal but frankly is just the nature of doing business and any number of niceties are lost by aggressively avoiding fingerprinting.
In software intentionally optimized to avoid any fingerprinting however it is a vulnerability.
The distinction being that fingerprinting in general is a less than ideal side effect that gives you a minor loss in privacy but in something like Tor Browser that fingerprinting can be life or death for a whistleblower, etc. It's the distinction between an annoyance and an execution.
I get criticizing their business and what they do wrong, but doesn't seem right to criticizing them for doing the right thing.
Its been my experience that the general public doesn't seem to follow patterns and instead focus on which switch is toggled at any given moment for a company's ethical practices. This is the main reason why we are constantly gamed by orgs that have a big picture view of crowd psychology.
I understand where you're coming from, by the way, but sometimes the worst person you know does the right thing and it's not fair to criticize them for doing it (you could say nothing, don't have to change your opinion about them, etc). We also don't want someone to go "if I'm bad no matter what I do, then might as well make some money with this" and sell the exploit.
Fucking HN sheep
Also, does anyone know of any researchers in the academic world focusing on this issue? We are aware that EFF has a project that used to be named after a pedophile on this subject, but we are more looking for professors at universities or pure research labs ala MSR or PARC than activists working for NGOs, however pure their praxis :-)
As privacy geeks, we have become fascinated with the topic -- it seems that while we can achieve security through extensions like noscript or ublock origin or firefox containers (our personal "holy trinity"), anonymity slips through our fingers due to fingerprinting issues. (Especially if we lump stylometry in the big bucket of "fingerprinting".)
[1] https://web.archive.org/web/20260422190706/https://fingerpri...
Make sure to exit Tor Browser at the end of a session. Make sure not to mix two uses in one session.
Why don't browsers make it like phones where the server (app) has to be granted permission to access stuff?
Apps have access to inconceivable amounts of identifiers and device characteristics, even on the well protected systems without Google Play services.
Like Android phones perhaps? Unfortunate Apple gives very little granular control.
But most ROMs don't allow controls for WiFi, Cell data, Phone ID, Phone number, User ID, local storage, etc...
And since browsers rival OSes for complexity (they are basically OSes in their own right already), any part of the system can be inadvertently exposed and exploited.
> In Firefox Private Browsing mode, the identifier can also persist after all private windows are closed, as long as the Firefox process remains running. In Tor Browser, the stable identifier persists even through the "New Identity" feature, which is designed to be a full reset that clears cookies and browser history and uses new Tor circuits.
1. Website fingerprints the browser, stores a cookie with an ID and a fingerprint.
2. During the next session, it fingerprints again and compares with the cookie. If fingerprint changed, notify server about old and new fingerprint.
Assume the same.
>The idea is to amass as much information as possible
Reminded, from 2012: https://www.wired.com/2012/03/ff-nsadatacenter/
The IndexedDB UUID is "shared across all origins", so why not use the contents of the database to identify browers, rather than the ordering?
The key vulnerability here is that, for the lifetime of that Firefox process, any website that makes that set of databases is going to see the exact same output ordering, no matter what the contents of those databases are. That makes this a fingerprint: it's a stable, high-entropy identifier that persists across time, even if the contents of those databases are not preserved. It is shared even across origins (where the contents would not be), and preserved after website data is deleted -- all a website has to do to re-acquire the fingerprint is recreate the databases with the same names and observe their ordering.
So it persists between anonymous sessions. So you could connect User A that logged out and reset the identity to User B who believed was using a fresh anonymous session and logged in afterwards.
That's why expansion of web standards is wrong. Browser should provide minimal APIs for interacting with device and features like IndexedDB can be implemented as WebAssembly library, leaking no valuable data.
For example, if canvas provided only access to picture buffer, and no drawing routines calling into platform-specific libraries, it would become useless for fingerprinting.
Or just open dev tools
Tor Browser also doesn't spoof navigator.platform at all for some reason, so sites can still see when you use Linux, even if the User-Agent is spoofing Windows.
I've heard a handful of people say this but are there examples of what I would imagine would have to be server-side fingerprinting and the granularity? Since most fingerprinting I'm aware of is client-side, running via JS. While I expect server-side checks to be limited to things like which resources haven't be loaded by a particular user and anything else normally available via server logs either way, which could limit the pool but I wonder how effective in terms of tracking uniqueness across sites.
We're talking about users of the Tor browser, and I'd be very surprised if this was the case (that a majority keep JS turned on)
Basically every Tor guide (heh) tells you to turn it off because it's a huge vector for all types of attacks. Most onion sites have captcha systems that work without JS too which would indicate that they expect a majority to have it disabled.
Joanna Rutkowska's understandable preference for older kernels had its advantages, but the current team is much more likely to ship somewhat newer kernels and I've been surprised by what hardware 4.3 has worked well on.
Beyond that, I'm currently running a kernel from late Feb/early Mar (6.19.5).
Driver support can still be an issue, and a Wi-Fi card that doesn't play nice with Linux in general is doing to be no different on Qubes OS.
> For security and product stakeholders, the key point is simple: even an API that appears harmless can become a cross-site tracking vector if it leaks stable process-level state.
This reads almost LLM-ish. The article on the whole does not appear so, but parts of it do.
Did you even read the article at all? Ah my children did bad in school, time to replace them with new children and a different spouse. This is what you're suggesting essentially. A browser is not just something you simply make out of thin air. There's decades of nuance to browser engines, and I'm only thinking of the HTML nuances, not the CSS or JS nuances.
>Physical isolation is a given safeguard that the digital world lacks
…
>In our digital lives, the situation is quite different: All of our activities typically happen on a single device. This causes us to worry about whether it’s safe to click on a link or install an app, since being hacked imperils our entire digital existence.
>Qubes eliminates this concern by allowing us to divide a device into many compartments, much as we divide a physical building into many rooms. …
Sold