24 pointsby LopRabbit8 hours ago7 comments
  • in-silico2 hours ago
    From my observations, there are generally four camps in the machine consciousness discussion:

    1. People who haven't really thought about it, and assume they're conscious because they talk like a human.

    2. People who haven't really thought about it, and assume they can't be conscious because humans are obviously somehow special. This appears to be the largest group, and is linked to our religiously rooted culture in which human exceptionalism is the default.

    Those first two groups comprise the majority of people, and are not worth engaging with.

    3. People who have thought about it, and came to the conclusion that they might be conscious, usually for computationalism/functionalism reasons. This is the group that I place myself in.

    4. People who have thought about it, and came to the conclusion that they can't be conscious, usually for biological naturalist reasons. This seems to be the predominant group on Hacker News (among those who discuss it).

    • sunrunner2 hours ago
      I'm not sure I'd agree that people in groups 1 and 2 aren't worth engaging with.

      The interesting bit to do for both cases is look at the 'they talk like a human' and 'are obviously somehow special' parts, separate the ideas of language, intelligence (memory, fluidity, abstract reasoning), _aliveness_ (as a biological process) and finally ideas about metacognition and theory of mind, and see whether their idea of consciousness as a super-bundle of the above (which is how I assume a lot of default ideas about consciousness are) actually sticks, or whether it falls apart when beings can have a subset of those properties but not all.

      Also, I nominate myself to be in the 'People who have thought about it and are becoming more doubtful that I myself am conscious, and the question might be moot.' group.

      • in-silico2 hours ago
        I'm curious about your doubting your own consciousness statement, given that "we humans are conscious" is pretty axiomic to its definition and one of the few pieces that most agree with.
        • Kim_Bruning2 hours ago
          Take a look at Daniel Dennett, for starters!

          If you're looking for one of the genuine angles on this:

          Consciousness is horrendously under-defined, to the point some people go something like "you know, at this point I figure we'd be better off not having this word at all. "

          Some days that's me, with a headache.

          • in-silicoan hour ago
            So it's more of a semantic argument than an actual rejection of the idea that you experience qualia/sentience/something?
    • joquarky44 minutes ago
      Yep, #2 feels like geocentrism all over again.
    • Kim_Bruning2 hours ago
      Am I the only person who is confused by there being a philosophy called "biological naturalism", which is not the science?
    • LeCompteSftwarean hour ago
      As someone who places themselves in #4, at some point the people in #3 need to accept a bit of scientific humility. The reason we are "biological naturalists" is that we can point to hundreds of thousands of conscious species on planet Earth which are not humans, and whose consciousness clearly has nothing to do with an ability to say "Forsooth, I am a conscious thinking being." AI folks have been ignoring this since Alan Turing! And it's not a coincidence that humanity has yet to build a robot which is convincingly smarter than a cockroach.

      If you grant that humans are conscious, then surely domestic cats are as well. It is simply irrational to talk about Claude's "consciousness" without actually engaging with this: cats, humans, pigeons, fish, etc etc all share some common features we associate with consciousness (I don't mean sensory awareness, I mean the fuzzy cognitive concept). Claude really does not. In fact Claude doesn't even have much in common with uncontacted hunter-gatherers! Claude imitates the solipsism of formally educated human philosophers.

      It is uncharitable and curmudgeonly but totally scientific to dismiss people in camp #3 as unserious and not worth engaging with: they ignore scientific criticism and don't provide any themselves, it's just a mishmash of sci-fi-adjacent philosophy. There's nothing "functional" about ignoring animals and there's nothing scientific about waving your hands and saying "computationalism." That's certainly how I feel. I know this isn't a very nice comment. But I am so sick of AI folks thinking they can ignore animals and still have an honest conversation about machine consciousness. It's just sci-fi ghost stories.

      • Kim_Bruning22 minutes ago
        Oh dear, just a short while after me saying I was confused by the term too.

        Are you sure you're a <biological naturalist>? [1] Which is to say, do you adhere to Searle's position about syntax not leading to semantics?

        Or is it more like: You're scientifically inclined, and thus you accept Ethology[2] or Neuroscience[3] as being an empirically rigorous studies of animal behavior and cognition respectively?

        Incidentally, Alan Turing's 1950 imitation game paper was actually pretty Ethological if you look it up. He immediately replaces the question "can machines think" with a more practical operationalization: the famous imitation game.

        [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biological_naturalism

        [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethology

        [3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neuroscience

        [4] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computing_Machinery_and_Intell...

      • reverius4225 minutes ago
        What is the evidence that non-human animals have the "fuzzy cognitive concept" we call consciousness, but Claude "really does not"?

        I personally have not been ignoring animal consciousness in how I think about the possibility of AI consciousness and I don't see how animals having consciousness means that AI can't.

  • diablozzq5 hours ago
    Consciousness is a property of humans biology - and quite clearly not a requisite to intelligence.

    I say clearly as at some point we reach proof by construction. As in, we already built intelligence because the system already completes tasks that require intelligence.

    We are so far into what would have been science fiction five years ago and the goal posts have moved so far.

    For anyone who disagrees, I challenge you to prove deep learning systems cannot solve <task with specific outcome humans can solve but not AI> given sufficient data and compute.

    I think the strongest sign we have true intelligence already is no one has built any benchmark that AI cannot solve.

    Yes, our current robotics lags AI, so we don’t have the equivalent of the human body to give our deep learning systems. Thus, it’s expected AI will be limited in physical scenarios.

    Second, hallucinations are present in humans. We are highly biased to ignore all the misspoken words in everyday life as we have error correction built into normal conversations. How often do you have to have someone repeat or rephrase something?

    It just doesn’t make sense to me.

    It’s like there are people out there whose belief systems are incompatible with this tech existing.

    Sure, it has limitations due to training data. It has limitations with no physical body. It cannot combine training and inference the same way a human does. But none of those are measures of intelligence or required to be intelligent.

    • joquarky40 minutes ago
      I only disagree with your first sentence:

      > Consciousness is a property of humans biology

      You're assuming consciousness is a product of biology rather than attracted to biology.

    • lukev4 hours ago
      "intelligence" is not well defined. LLMs are throwing this into high relief with how "spiky" their capability curve is. Yes, they can solve some crazy hard problems with enough compute and thinking tokens. Yes, they also fall down in the dumbest ways without an ability to self-correct... despite how "smart" they are, human supervision remains absolutely critical for any system of importance.

      But I don't think the takeaway is "humans are intelligent and LLMs are not", it's that our vocabulary for talking about the intersection of language, cognition and compute is not up for the task.

      • diablozzq2 hours ago
        Intelligence was supposedly well defined, but folks kept getting their definitions wrecked by modern LLMs so we had to move the goal posts.

        No true Scottsman fallacy.

    • duped4 hours ago
      I cannot express concisely how deeply I disagree with all of this.

      It is not just uninteresting that computer programs can be written to accomplish information tasks, it's intellectually dishonest to anthropomorphize machines and algorithms to characterize it as consciousness.

      > no one has built any benchmark that AI cannot solve

      "Be human."

      • diablozzq2 hours ago
        no one cares if LLMs are humans. They will never be by definition.

        My point still stands

        The crux of my argument is Consciousness is irrelevant to any AI debates. It’s not necessary to perform tasks we previously deemed only humans could do.

  • mstank5 hours ago
    Glad to see Searle's Chinese Room mentioned early on in the paper. "Syntax is not sufficient for semantics," no matter how much compute we throw at the problem.

    My very amateur view is that until the underlying compute architecture and substrate resembles artificial biology more than silicon, we wont get there.

    The latest advances in AI have given me even more appreciation of biology and evolution. It's incredible what the human brain can do with about 20 watts of power, barely enough to power a lightbulb, in comparison to what it takes to run even our most basic LLM models.

    • Kim_Bruning2 hours ago
      Hofstadter and Dennett have taken great pains to try to debunk Searle. No love lost in that corner of the philosophical world.
  • Kim_Bruning3 hours ago
    I'm partial to bioinformatics as per Pauline Hogeweg's definition; which explicitly has computation as a property of life.

    This approach actually makes testable (and tested) scientific predictions.

    This makes Searle-derived papers super-weird for me; since from my perspective they seem to disprove the existence of life. (and it makes the name of the philosophy "biological naturalism" very ironic to me :-P )

    (for extra irony, Turing actually went into biology late in his life. See: Turing 1952 "The Chemical Basis of Morphogenesis" )

  • tmvphilan hour ago
    > To fully understand the difference between the embodied robot running an algorithm on a chip and the biological mapmaker, we need to remember that for the latter, subjective experience is a given, not because of abstract information processing, but because of a specific, metabolically constituted physical reality.

    Total drivel. Consciousness in biological systems is "a given" because of metabolism?

  • jdmoreira4 hours ago
    This is the complete opposite of Hofstadter's "Strange Loop" hypothesis, which intuitively makes much more sense to me.
    • defterGoosean hour ago
      It's the pervasive theme in the book, but never really given a conceptual grounding further than "this sort of looks like recursion or can be modelled circularly so it's a strange loop". The vagueness of it reveals itself as being "more intuitive", because a vaguer pattern will have more matches. I don't remember Hofstadter digressing on whether these loops work "in reverse" either, which is sort of what the author here is denying. Basically positing that f doesn't have a well-defined inverse.
  • yogthos5 hours ago
    The paper makes a huge assumption that only thermodynamic constitutions can produce consciousness. The assumptions seems completely unsubstantiated given that thermodynamics are just states and states are replicable. The whole Chinese Room idea is pure sophistry as well. Both Dennett and Hofstadter address it quite well in Consciousness Explained and I am a Strange Loop respectively.
    • emp17344an hour ago
      You know that Dennett and Hofstadter aren’t the beginning and end of Philosophy of Mind, right? Calling Searle’s Room “complete sophistry” is hilariously misguided, considering the vast majority of academic philosophers consider it valid: https://survey2020.philpeople.org/survey/results/5002#
      • Kim_Bruning13 minutes ago
        You'll need to unpack that survey for us a bit. There's a lot going on and the wording is very terse.