"Here, by leveraging advances in high-rate quantum error-correcting codes, efficient logical instruction sets, and circuit design, we show that Shor’s algorithm can be executed at cryptographically relevant scales with as few as 10,000 reconfigurable atomic qubits. "
That's physical, not logical qubits.
PQC is not defined as "being resistant to quantum attacks" nor does it necessarily have this property: PQC is just cryptography for which no quantum attack is known yet (for example even when no one has tried to design a quantum computation to break the cryptography). One can not demonstrate that a specific PQC altorithm is resistant to quantum attacks, it is merely presumed until proven otherwise.
Its the only responsible thing to do.
This would leave holders who did not sign in two categories:
1) If you never sent a tx with an address, then you did not reveal your public key, and have some safety, e.g. you could do the PQ signature, wait, and be fine.
2) If you did, then you revealed your public key, and didn't bother to make the cutoff, and well, too bad.
There was a bunch of frankly dumb analysis about how long this would take the chain to process and how expensive it would be assuming that miners would all continue to enforce 10 minute blocks and transaction fees for these signature txs. I would be very surprised if the mining industry shot itself in the foot like that. The actual time to process 200mm or so new signatures just isn't that long. Hey we could do it on Solana if we needed to. That said, I imagine the papers this week plus Google moving up its timeline mean that there will be a concerted effort in Bitcoin land to get a real process down and tested in the next couple of years. Pretty cool.
Finally, I've read very little analysis about whether or not miners would choose to continue the energy dependent nature of mining, or try and move on. I think this is a pretty interesting economic question; I'm looking forward to finding out the answer. I expect mining will have a longer lead time than the signature problem - we're a long way from having Grover implementing SHA-256 as far as I know. And even then you still have 128 bits to deal with ONCE you get an equivalent amount of Grover-capable quantum compute out to the current ASIC ecosystem.
And why do they think that the US government would care about securing cryptocurrencies? Aren't they designed to circumvent the government regulation?
No
> why do they think that the US government would care about securing cryptocurrencies?
Our largest institutions manage tens of billions of dollars in cryptocurrency and the US government has designated currencies appropriate for the strategic crypto reserve
> Why do they [not care] about the entire world's infrastructures that are based on RSA and elliptic curve algorithms, such as HTTPS
I'm sure they do. But if you had a working quantum computer that could a) get Satoshi's keys or b) read some emails, most people choose door a first. So it's both a smoke test and a high value target with an easy to assess dollar value.
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-rise-of-stablecoins-a...
[1] Here's my source and they should of course know https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/MVMTD027MNFRBDAL
i think google is just a disgustingly large company lol, it's hard to talk about them "caring" about one thing but not another