This forcing function will occur regardless of who is in power. The world (China, mostly) produces enough EVs, solar, and batteries to make it happen, it’s just a matter of economics and time.
The people in charge today are temporary, the investments made in clean tech today will last decades.
https://ember-energy.org/data/china-cleantech-exports-data-e...
(China is ~1/3 of global manufacturing capacity)
As, I suspect, will the damage to the civil service and the scientific community.
The appetite for the "boots on the ground" among the US public is almost zero. I doubt that even a large false flag would work at this point.
The hardest part of Trump's 2 week war is going to be the first six years.
The weird thing is practically every strategist has known this since the 1980s. Iran's geography means as long as it controls its Gulf-coast border, it can control the Strait.
I hope countries (or rather, voters) around the world are waking up to just how helplessly dependent they are on a resource they do not own and have to beg and scrape from others.
They may end up believing they are being impacted, but many will still deny or argue the root cause.
Technically no. The oil we export isn’t a fit for the oil we refine. We’re slaved to the global market, though our exports do give us a tool. (Unfortunately, it requires taxing oil production (since we can’t tax exports [1]) to pay for, ideally, a monthly cheque to every American, and less ideally, a refiner credit to push down domestic gas prices.
[1] https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/artI-S9-C5-1/...
Now there seems to be virtually no patriotic sentiment except for the face-keeping from officials and some hardcore supporters who just repeat anything. But many Americans seem utterly confused.
Yes on feet. No on nuclear. Iran's economy, for the near term, is trashed. It's going to need to choose between sovereighty and wealth. If it chooses the formewr, it lacks the resources to complete the project. If it chooses the latter, it probably goes with China, which means its nuclear programme will be constrained.
> force the end of the PetroDollar in the process
Sigh. Petrodollar hypothesis hasn't been a thing for decades. Various countries price and settle oil in currencies other than dollars. Dollar demand due to oil is a vanishing fraction of total international dollar demand. Like, oil could swap to being entirely traded in Bitcoin and it might make the next Fed meeting's agenda.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/mar/20/china-oil-rese...
Planned for, yes. Insulated, no. China remains the world's largest importer of crude [1].
[1] https://www.worldstopexports.com/crude-oil-imports-by-countr...
https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/china-targets-steady...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategic_petroleum_reserve_(C...
That's 117 days, or four months, of imports [1]. Half of Hormuz-transiting oil ends up in China [2]. So even if China fully substitutes lost imports with reserves, that's not even taking them through the end of the year. (And China running down its reserves is a strategic win for America. It means they aren't available to buffer a blockade of the Straits of Malacca.)
I don't even know of a credible economist in China arguing China is insulated from this shock.
[1] https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=64544#:~:tex...
[2] https://www.visualcapitalist.com/charted-oil-trade-through-t...
For actual Hormuz, PRC gets 6/12mbd. They really only need ~8m for domestic use, other 4m is discretionary, i.e. reselling refined petro/petchem or heating, stuff which can be forgone without degrading domestic operations or rapidly electrified. So really PRC only dealing with 2mbd import shortfall if Hormuz fully closed, their SPR will stretch for couple years at current runway if they just forgo discretionary oil use, and by the time it empties, if PRC goes ham on domestic EV / freight at current adoption, with active coal to X in pipeline, they can displace another that 2m barrels. Only way for PRC SPR to run dry end of year is if US starts blockading Malacca tomorrow and glass pipelines. Otherwise PRC on trend to survive with massive advantage vs everyone else.
Energy geopolitics to consider is unless Hormuz shuts down completely by Iran (or US), PRC gets first dibs on energy products by default, all existing contracts are going to be force majeured, and only way any GCC producer is going to make money is by selling to PRC first if Iran serious and can enforce petro-yuan. Also with 20% energy mix from oil vs 40% from US, and electric freight options for logistics, PRC simply better setup to weather high energy prices and disruptions. Their coal petchem stack = they are now permanently cheaper than all other (oil/naphtha based) industrial competitors who bluntly can't even pull the overproduction card vs PRC because their production will crater from lack of of inputs creating condition to reinforce PRC as primary global producer. No one can outproduce PRC in high oil scenario because no one has PRC price stable coal to liquid/chemical stack that serves as energy fortress that decouples most of PRC economy/industry from oil prices. TLDR, PRC is relatively derisked from Hormuz already, if US wants to actually snowball oil disruption into advantage vs PRC, they need to start war with PRC right now. Otherwise sustained high oil price going to be net positive for PRC vs basically everyone else.
Implications of the Conflict in the Middle East for China’s Energy Security - https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/implications-of-the-co... - March 4th, 2026
Ember Energy: China - https://ember-energy.org/countries-and-regions/china/ - February 2026
China’s LNG imports were dropping before this crisis.
China’s LNG imports fell 12% in 2025 despite remaining world’s top buyer - https://www.icis.com/explore/resources/news/2025/12/30/11168... - December 30th, 2025
(I agree there will be some pain, but argue that China has sufficiently prepared for a fossil supply chain disruption of this magnitude, while also having the industrial state capacity to achieve a more favorable long term trajectory; they are deploying ~400GW+ of renewables annually at current deployment rates)
Where we agree is in China having massively reduced the impact of this shock. (And, probably, in them succeeding in insulating themselves completely within a generation.)
Where we don't is in this still being a stagflationary hit to China and, probably, a worse economic hit to them than it will be to us.
Put more succinctly, the first and second derivatives are massively favourable. But the actual level still produces lots of vulnerability. China will be better off than its neighbours. But it's still going to get screwed even if the war ends tomorrow, which it isn't.
It's the kind of late-edit things that spurs me to include quotes in replies.