This, somehow, triggered my mind to recall LifeLock's CEO Todd Davis’s public marketing campaign where he displayed his Social Security number on the company website and advertisements to demonstrate the security of his platform, however, the challenge backfired dramatically and he becomes a victim of identity theft on at least 13 separate occasions.
Protocol design choices that allow unauthenticated memory writes after initial authentication Lack of atomicity when writing cryptographic keys across multiple memory pages Widespread misconfiguration in real-world deployments (unlocked memory, static keys) Non-NXP compatible chips with severely flawed random number generators
Triple-DES has 168 bit keys. Even if you use a meet-in-the-middle attack, your attack cost has an exponent of 112 (with an associated memory cost with an exponent of 88).
That's not practically exploitable today.
If you think I'm wrong, here's a single block message encrypted with 3DES, then hex-encoded. Have fun:
924db449f52ea976
> Converse curiously; don't cross-examine.
You could have just corrected them and not goaded them into further revealing their ignorance. Yes, they underestimated how difficult it is to crack 3DES. You could have simply told them that.
The thread that ensued, a discussion of what it means for a cipher to be obsoleted or unsafe versus "broken", is an actually-interesting question.
I feel pretty OK about how this went.
> The DES and Triple DES ciphers, as used in the TLS, SSH, and IPSec protocols and other protocols and products, ...
They're clearly talking about it's use as a cipher. Again, someone who has been here as long as you have should understand that you shouldn't put words in their mouth or be evasive in this way.
The conversation would still have touched on these interesting topics, and would likely have done so more immediately.
They were clearly suggesting that there exists a publicly available tool to attack this algorithm. They clearly didn't care one way or the other about whether it was used in passwords. What they actually cited was vulnerabilities in network services.
You are being disingenuous. Cut it out.
They were clearly suggesting that there exists a publicly available tool to attack this algorithm.
What were you referring to? If it was Hashcat, then I have just one more question:
Is Hashcat a publicly available tool that attacks AES?
with a quick google of "3des broken" and reading the first paragraph of wikipedia on 3des, i was able to guess (correctly!) what they original commenter was referring to.
There's a reason POCs matter right? Why you feel comfortable (even though I don't agree) saying multi-threaded Go doesn't have a memory safety problem and yet you wouldn't feel comfortable making the same claim for C++.
Granted, a 2^32 block limit is pretty severe by modern standards.
The 64 bit block size in 3DES (and Blowfish and IDEA) limits how much data you can encrypt under a single key. I think the real "tell" that this isn't hair-splitting is that people don't ever generally talk about Blowfish being "broken", just obsoleted.
that sounds "broken" to me, but i'm not a cryptographer. so, i'll defer to you when you say it's not broken. (i dont know what the cryptographer-specific definition of broken is -- it'd be great if you would shed some light on that)