lego --domains 206.189.27.68 --accept-tos --http --disable-cn run --profile shortlived
(seems to be WIP https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy/issues/7399)
A properly configured DoH server (perhaps running unbound) with a properly constructed configuration profile which included a DoH FQDN with a proper certificate would not work in iOS.
The reason, it turns out, is that iOS insisted that both the FQDN and the IP have proper certificates.
This is why the configuration profiles from big organizations like dns4eu and nextdns would work properly when, for instance, installed on an iphone ... but your own personal DoH server (and profile) would not.
- 8 is a lucky number and a power of 2
- 8 lets me refresh weekly and have a fixed day of the week to check whether there was some API 429 timeout
- 6 is the value of every digit in the number of the beast
- I just don't like 6!
There’s your answer.
6 days means on a long enough enough timeframe the load will end up evenly distributed across a week.
8 days would result in things getting hammered on specific days of the week.
people will put */5 in cron and result will be same, because that's obvious, easy and nice number.
Currently ACME sets its cron job to 12 days on 90 day certificates.
200 would be a nice round number that gets you to 8 1/3 days, so it comes with the benefits of weekly rotation.
* https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9799
* https://onionservices.torproject.org/research/appendixes/acm...
I think acme.sh supports it though.
We also support ACME profiles (required for short lived certs) as of v1.18 which is our oldest currently supported[1] version.
We've got some basic docs[2] available. Profiles are set on a per-issuer basis, so it's easy to have two separate ACME issuers, one issuing longer lived certs and one issuing shorter, allowing for a gradual migration to shorter certs.
[1]: https://cert-manager.io/docs/releases/ [2]: https://cert-manager.io/docs/configuration/acme/#acme-certif...
Using the long ago past as FUD here is not useful.
This is no criticism, I like what they do, but how am I supposed to do renewals? If something goes wrong, like the pipeline triggering certbot goes wrong, I won't have time to fix this. So I'd be at a two day renewal with a 4 day "debugging" window.
I'm certain there are some who need this, but it's not me. Also the rationale is a bit odd:
> IP address certificates must be short-lived certificates, a decision we made because IP addresses are more transient than domain names, so validating more frequently is important.
Are IP addresses more transient than a domain within a 45 day window? The static IPs you get when you rent a vps, they're not transient.
6 days actually seems like a long time for this situation!
I think a pattern like that is reasonable for a 6-day cert:
- renew every 2 days, and have a "4 day debugging window" - renew every 1 day, and have a "5 day debugging window"
Monitoring options: https://letsencrypt.org/docs/monitoring-options/
This makes me wonder if the scripts I published at https://heyoncall.com/blog/barebone-scripts-to-check-ssl-cer... should have the expiry thresholds defined in units of hours, instead of integer days?
These changes are coming from the CAB forum, which includes basically every entity that ships a popular web browser and every entity that ships certificates trusted in those browsers.
There are use cases for certificates that exist outside of that umbrella, but they are by definition niche.
So no one that actually has to renew these certificates.
Hey! How long does a root certificate from a certificate authority last?
10 to 25 years?
Why don't those last 120 minutes? They're responsible for the "security" of the whole internet aren't they?
Hardly 'by definition niche' IMHO.
Nobody is being forced to use 6-day certs for domains though, when the time comes Let's Encrypt will default to 47 days just like everyone else.
The people who innovate in security are failing to actually create new ways to verify things, so all that everyone else in the security industry can do to make things more secure is shorten the cert expiration. It's only logical that they'll keep doing it.
Thing is, NOTHING, is stopping anyone from already getting short lived certs and being 'proactive' and rotating through. What it is saying is, well, we own the process so we'll make Chrome not play ball with your site anymore unless you do as we say...
The CA system has cracks, that short lived certs don't fix, so meanwhile we'll make everyone as uncomfortable as possible while we rearrange deck chairs.
awaiting downvotes in earnest.
(The classic problem with self-signed certs being that TOFU doesn’t scale to millions of users, particularly ones who don’t know what a certificate fingerprint is or what it means when it changes.)
Though if I may put on my tinfoil hat for a moment, I wonder if current algorithms for certificate signing have been broken by some government agency or hacker group and now they're able to generate valid certificates.
But I guess if that were true, then shorter cert lives wouldn't save you.
This makes sense from a security perspective, insofar as you agree with the baseline position that revocations should always be honored in a timely manner.
Probably not. For browsers to accept this certificate it has to be logged in a certificate transparency log for anyone to see, and no such certificates have been seen to be logged.
TLS certs should be treated much more akin to SSH host keys in the known hosts file. Browsers should record the cert the first time they see it and then warn me if it changes before it's expiration date, or some time near the expiration date.
Obviously you might still be victim #1 of such a scheme... But in general the CA's now aren't really trusted anymore - the real root of trust is the CT logs.
the ENTIRE reason the short lifetime is used for the LE certs is that they haven't figured out how to make revoking work at scale.
Now if you're on latest browser you might be fine but any and every embedded device have their root CAs updated only on software update, which means compromise of CA might easily get access to hundreds of thousands devices.
This is great, and actually constructive!
I use, a hack i put together http://www.jofla.net/php__/CertChecker/ to keep a list (in json) of a bunch of machines (both https and SSH) and the last fingerprints/date it sees. Every time it runs i can see if any server has changed, just is a heads-up for any funny business. Sure its got shortcommings, it doesnt mimmic headers and such but its a start.
It would be great if browsers could all, you know, have some type of distributed protocol, ie DHT where by at least some concensus about whether this cert has been seen by me or enough peers lately.
Having a ton of CAs and the ability to have any link in that chain sing for ANY site is crazy, and until you've seen examples of abuse you assume the foundations are sound.
If I don't assign an EIP to my EC2 instance and shut it down, I'm nearly guaranteed to get a different IP when I start it again, even if I start it within seconds of shutdown completing.
It'd be quite a challenge to use this behavior maliciously, though. You'd have to get assigned an IP that someone else was using recently, and the person using that IP would need to have also been using TLS with either an IP address certificate or with certificate verification disabled.
Otoh, if you're dealing with browsers, they really like WebPKI certs, and if you're directing load to specific servers in real time, why add DNS and/or a load balancer thing in the middle?
Which should push you to automate the process.
Arguably setting up letsencrypt is "manual setup". What you can do is run a split-horizon DNS setup inside your LAN on an internet-routable tld, and then run a CA for internal devices. That gives all your internal hosts their own hostname.sub.domain.tld name with HTTPS.
Frankly: it's not that much more work, and it's easier than remembering IP addresses anyway.
There would be no way of determining that I can connecting to my-organisation's 10.0.0.1 and not bad-org's 10.0.0.1.
ie. https://10.0.0.1(af81afa8394fd7aa)/index.htm
The identifier would be generated by the certificate authority upon your first request for a certificate, and every time you renew you get to keep the same one.
To use it, you need a valid certificate for the connection to the server which has a hostname that does get broadcast in readable form. For companies like Cloudflare, Azure, and Google, this isn't really an issue, because they can just use the name of their proxies.
For smaller sites, often not hosting more than one or two domains, there is hardly a non-distinct hostname available.
With IP certificates, the outer TLS connection can just use the IP address in its readable SNI field and encrypt the actual hostname for the real connection. You no longer need to be a third party proxying other people's content for ECH to have a useful effect.
Even if it did work, the privacy value of hiding the SNI is pretty minimal for an IP address that hosts only a couple domains, as there are plenty of databases that let you look up an IP address to determine what domain names point there - e.g. https://bgp.tools/prefix/18.220.0.0/14#dns
> In verifying the client-facing server certificate, the client MUST interpret the public name as a DNS-based reference identity [RFC6125]. Clients that incorporate DNS names and IP addresses into the same syntax (e.g. Section 7.4 of [RFC3986] and [WHATWG-IPV4]) MUST reject names that would be interpreted as IPv4 addresses.
Actually the main benefit is no dependency on DNS (booth direct and root).
IP is a simple primitive, i.e. "is it routable or not ?".
To be pedantic for a moment, ARIN etc. are registries.
The registrar is your ISP, cloud provider etc.
You can get a PI (Provider Independent) allocation for yourself, usually with the assistance of a sponsoring registrar. Which is a nice compromise way of cutting out the middleman without becoming a registrar yourself.
The biggest modern-era reason is direct access to update your RPKI entries.
But this only matters if you are doing stuff that makes direct access worthwhile.
If your setup is mostly "set and forget" then you should just accept the lag associated with needing to open a ticket with your sponsor to update the RPKI.
There's also this little thing called DNS over TLS and DNS over HTTPS that you might have heard of ? ;)
VBA et al succeeded because they enabled workers to move forward on things they would otherwise be blocked on organizationally
Also - not seeing this kind of thing could be considered a gap in your vision. When outsiders accuse SV of living in a high-tech ivory tower, blind to the realities of more common folk, this is the kind of thing they refer to.
* An outer SNI name when doing ECH perhaps
* Being able to host secure http/mail/etc without being beholden to a domain registrar
E.g.:
[1] https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/encryption/dns-ove...
[2] https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/encryption/dns-ove...
Other than basically being a pain in the ass.
But what risks are attached with such a short refresh?
Is there someone at the top of the certificate chain who can refuse to give out further certificates within the blink of an eye?
If yes, would this mean that within 6 days all affected certificates would expire, like a very big Denial of Service attack?
And after 6 days everybody goes back to using HTTP?
Maybe someone with more knowledge about certificate chains can explain it to me.
With a 30 day cert with renewal 10-15 days in advance that gives you breathing room
Personally I think 3 days is far too short unless you have your automation pulling from two different suppliers.
How many "top of chain" providers is letsencrypt using? Are they a single point of failure in that regard?
I'd imagine that other "top of chain" providers want money for their certificates and that they might have a manual process which is slower than letsencrypt?
But in general, one of the points of ACME is to eliminate dependence on a single provider, and prevent vendor lock-in. ACME clients should ideally support multiple ACME CAs.
For example, Caddy defaults to both LE and ZeroSSL. Users can additionally configure other CAs like Google Trust Services.
This document discusses several failure modes to consider: https://github.com/https-dev/docs/blob/master/acme-ops.md#if...
It depends. If the ACME client is configured to only use Let’s Encrypt, then the answer is yes. But the client could fall-back to Google’s CA, ZeroSSL, etc. And then there is no single point of failure.
ZeroSSL/HID Global seems to be quite multi-national though, and it’s owned by a Swedish company (Assa Abloy).
I don’t know what what kind of mitigations these orgs have in place if the shit really hits the fan in the US. It’s an interesting question for sure.
The US has strong institutions which prevent the President or Government at large controlling these on a whim. If those institutions fail then they could all push out an update which removes all "top of chain" trusted certificate authorities other than ones approved by the US government.
In that situation the internet is basically finished as it stands now, and the OSes would be non-trustworthy anyway.
Fixing the SSL problems is the easy part, the free world would push its own root certificate out -- which people would have to manually install from a trusted source, but that's nothing compared to the real problem.
Sure, Ubuntu, Suse etc aren't based in the US, but the number of phones without a US based OS is basically zero, you'd have to start from scratch with a forked version of android which likely has NSA approved backdoors in it anyway. Non-linux based machines would also need to be wiped.
It would be nice to at least have a very high level contingency plan because in worst case I won't be able to google it.
You could argue that The Don in charge of the US is in control of letsencrypt
A simple windows to linux migration is not enough. If certificates expire without a way to refresh you'd either need to manually touch every machine to swap root certificates or have some of other contingency plan.
If you are supposed to have an establishable identity I think there is DNSSEC back to the registrar for a name and (I'm not quite sure what?) back to the AS.for the IP.
Why? Even regular certs are handed out via IP address.
2) App stores review apps because they want to verify functionality and compliance with rules, not just as a box-checking exercise. A code signing cert provides no assurances in that regard.
app store review isn't what I was talking about, I meant not having to verify your identity with the appstore, and use your own signing cert which can be used between platforms. Moreover, it would be less costly to develop signed windows apps. It costs several hundred dollars today.