https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/What_Is_It_Like_to_Be_a_Bat%3F
> Nagel asserts that "an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism—something it is like for the organism."
That is, that chatgpt cannot _be_ because if it could there would in fact _be_ something that is like _being_ chatgpt.
Imagine we could prove that there is nothing it is like to be ChatGPT
You could rephrase it as "Imagine that we could prove that there is no existence equal to the existence of chatgpt"
The analogical form of the English expression "what it is like" is misleading. It does not mean "what (in our experience) it resembles," but rather "how it is for the subject himself."
Nagel "What is it like to be a bat?"