I guess the main takeaway is to be careful using rsync connections to machines that you don't trust.
Which (in my paranoid opinion) is pretty much the only secure use case anyway, for code like rsync.
Not quite. If server has "command=rsync ..." in ~/.ssh/authorized_keys file, for some ssh key (to allow rsync access, but deny shell access), this vulnerability will allow attacker in possession of that ssh key to go around that restriction, and get shell nonetheless.
If I was running an rsync daemon facing the public, it would be in a chroot with dropped privileges.
But I wonder of OpenBSD's openrsync has the same issue ? Or did that version avoid the issues when it was created ?
If it was avoided, seems OpenBSD was ahead of the curve again.
rsync (3.2.7-1+deb12u1) bookworm-security; urgency=high
It impacts those who need to use `-r` (recursive) together with `-H` (preserve hardlinks),
I did not know people did that.
Gentoo's package manager most typically updates over rsync.